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COMMENT
Gulf of Venezuela: A Proposed Delimitation
ROBERTO D. KLOCK"
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflicting territorial claims between two nations are a familiar
chapter of international law. Interesting questions arise when the
contested area is finally delimited, but no provisions are made for
outlying marine rights. Are corresponding territorial sea and con-
tinental shelf rights impliedly granted in such a situation? If so,
would territorial sea rights be based upon the three mile rule in force
at the time of the delimitation or upon the current twelve mile rule?
If the parties remain silent as to the delimitation of the marine rights,
does that silence indicate that the original marine rights of each party
remain undisturbed, subject to future negotiation? Do any special
circumstances create exceptions to general rules?
These considerations are relevant to the delimitation of the Gulf
of Venezuela. Pursuant to the 1941 Treaty on Demarcation of Borders
and Navigation of Common Rivers between Colombia and Venezuela
(hereinafter referred to as the Treaty),1 Venezuela relinquished to
Colombia most of its claim to an arid region called the Guajira, a
peninsula extending along the Gulf of Venezuela and Caribbean Sea.
Although title to the Guajira resulted in providing Colombia with a
small coast adjacent to the Gulf of Venezuela, the treaty made no
mention of respective marine rights in the Gulf. The present dispute
concerns the respective claims of Colombia and Venezuela to ter-
ritorial sea and continental shelf rights in the Gulf of Venezuela.
*Estudio Bentata, Hot & Asociados, Caracas, Venezuela; LL.M., University of
Texas; J.D., St. Mary's University of San Antonio; B.A., University of Texas;
admitted to the Bar in Texas, California, and Arkansas.
1. Reprinted in MINISTEBJO DE RELACIONES ExTERIosEs, OFICINA DE
LONGITUDES Y FRONTERAS, AIBEGLO DE LiMITES ENTRE LA REPTJBLICA DE
COLOMBIA Y LA REPIOBLICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE VENEZUELA 213-14 (1943)
(hereinafter cited as Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores); A. AscANo JIMiNEZ,
EL GOLFO DE VENEZUELA ES TERRITOaIO VENEZOLANO 180-83 (1974) (herein-
after cited as Ascanio Jim6nez); G. PULECIO DE GUABUN, COLOMBIA DENTRO DE
LAS ORcANIZACIONES MARiTIMAS INTERNACIONALES 161-63 (1968) (hereinafter
cited as Pulecio de Guarin).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
Particularly at stake is the income from proven oil deposits and valuable
minerals in the seabed of the Gulf.2
The claims of both countries overlap. Colombia claims that the
territorial sea and continental shelf rights in the Gulf should be re-
solved by use of the median or equidistance line. On the other hand,
Venezuela relies upon historical title to the Gulf and other special
circumstances, and argues that since the 1941 Treaty makes no men-
tion of territorial rights in the Gulf, silence does not forfeit any long-
held Venezuelan interests in the Gulf.
Precise territorial boundaries along the border between Colombia
and Venezuela have been the subject of numerous controversies and
proposals.3 This paper examines the two areas of the Gulf of Venezuela
which are the subject of the current controversy. The major dis-
pute centers on the delimitation of the Gulf south of Castilletes as
between adjacent states in the Guajira Peninsula. The other problem
involves marine rights pertaining to Los Monjes, a small group of
Venezuelan islands situated between opposite states at the entrance
to the Gulf. Finally, this paper suggests a delimitation which, if
accepted by the parties, would resolve this lingering problem.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The territories of both Colombia and Venezuela were once Span-
ish colonies. The viceroyalty at Lima dominated all of South America
except the coast of Venezuela, which was subject to its own captain-
general.4  Following their independence from Spain, Colombia,
2. It is estimated that at least twenty million barrels of oil are subject to
capture. See H. HOLGUIN PELkEZ, PROYECCIONES DE UN LIMITE MA~iIfrMO
ENTRE COLOMBIA Y VENEZUELA 88 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Holguin
Pelhez).
3. An attache to one of the embassies in Washington asked the writer
several years ago to show him how to lay down a 'boundary' between
Colombia and Venezuela in these waters. No literature on such tech-
niques was found, and several hypotheses were formulated and tried
successively. Perhaps no more interesting problem of this sort could
have been posed, for the example has about all possible variations.
Boggs, Delimitation of Seaward Areas under National Jurisdiction, 45 Am. J.
INT'L L. 240, 262 n.35 (1951) (hereinafter cited as Boggs). See generally
R. CARPIO CASTMLO, FRONTERAS MAPirTIAS DE VENEZUELA 93-119 (1974)
(hereinafter cited as Carpio Castillo); E. ZULETA ANGEL, EL LLAMaDO GOLFO
DE VENEZUELA 85-108 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Zuleta Angel); Ascanio
Jim6nez, supra note 1, at 76-82; Holguin Pel~ez, supra note 2, at 57-90.
4. Until 1550, Colombia and Venezuela were under the jurisdiction of
the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. Spain then established the Audiencia of
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Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama were the subject of Simon Bolivar's
dream of one united nation, Gran Colombia. However, in 1830,
Ecuador and Venezuela withdrew from the Confederation.
The boundaries between Colombia and Venezuela were never
precisely demarcated during Spanish rule.6 Nevertheless, since the
days of the first Spanish expeditions, Cabo de la Vela served as the
border on the Caribbean Sea.' This site, located in the northwestern
part of the Guajira Peninsula in present-day Colombia, allocated vir-
tually all of the Guajira to Venezuela, and as a result, Venezuelan
Santa Fe de Bogota with jurisdiction over what are now Colombia and Venezuela,
then collectively called New Granada. The regime became a viceroyalty
(Viceroyalty of New Granada) in 1718, and this arrangement continued until
1777 when Venezuela was made a separate captaincy-general directly under
the Crown. Isolated from both Bogoti and Spain, Venezuela exercised a great
deal of local autonomy throughout the colonial period.
Viceroys and captains-general had essentially the same functions, differing
only in the importance and the extent of the territory assigned to the jurisdic-
tion of the former. Each was the supreme civil and military officer of his
territory. In 1700, there were two great American viceroyalties: the viceroyalty
of New Spain, with its capital at Mexico City, included all Spanish possessions
north of the Isthmus of Panama; that of Peru, with its capital at Lima, em-
braced all of Spanish America except the coast of Venezuela. Captains-general
were theoretically subordinate to the viceroys but in practice were virtually
independent of them and governed large subdivisions of these vast jurisdictions.
5. To a geographer, the term "demarcation" refers to the actual laying
down of a boundary line on the ground, and its definition by boundary pillars
or other similar physical means. "Delimitation," on the other hand, means the
determination of a boundary line, by treaty or otherwise, and its definition, in
written, verbal terms. Boggs, supra note 4, at 242 n.10.
6. Several authorities can be found which substantiate this historical claim
to the peninsula and thus, much of the Gulf of Venezuela. Accounts about the
Spanish explorer, Alonso de Ojeda, who with Amerigo Vespucci first explored
the coasts of Venezuela, often refer to that small cape as the dividing point
between the two territories. A more persuasive reference is found in an agree-
ment made in 1528 between Carlos V of Castilla and the German banking
family Welser from Uhim. In order to outbid Francis I of France for the vacant
title of Holy Roman Emperor, Carlos V had borrowed large sums from the
Welsers. These loans were secured by an indefinite lease on Venezuela, extend-
ing from Cabo de la Vela, with the right to found cities, open mines, and take
slaves. In 1576, L6pez de Velesco referred to Cabo de la Vela as the point
where Venezuelan soil ends in his work GEOGRAFiA DE LAS INDiAS. Further-
more, in 1789, Antonio de Alcedo made a similar statement in DiccloNAio
HIST61PCO-GEOcPRFICO DE AMEiRICA. Other writings are in accord, inferring
that Cabo de la Vela marked the western limit of Venezuela at least up to
the time of independence, a period of more than three hundred years. See
generally J. LONDONO PAREDES, DERECHO TERIUTORIAL DE COLOMBIA 20, 29
(1973) (hereinafter cited as Londono Paredes); Ascanio Jim6nez, supra note 1,
at 24; Carpio Castillo, supra note 4, at 78-79; J. LONDONO, NUEVA GEOPOLiTICA
DE COLOMBIA 36 (undated).
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territory surrounded the Gulf. Venezuela, therefore, has a historical
claim to these territories.
Upon achieving independence, Venezuela and Colombia implic-
itly included the doctrine of uti possidetis I in their constitutions."
Under this doctrine, each nation would retain the territories that were
held immediately prior to the date of independence in 1810. How-
ever, due to the vagueness of the Spanish demarcation of the bounda-
ries, the inaccessibility of the frontier areas, and the inaccuracy of
maps, the two countries were compelled to resort to continued negotia-
tions and surveys.
In 1833, representatives of both nations initialed a treaty which,
among other things, would have established a definite boundary in
the Guajira.' Although ratified by Colombia and overwhelmingly
recommended by Venezuelan negotiators, the treaty was ultimately
rejected by Venezuela because the border would have been established
at Cabo de Chichivacoa, a point which divided the Guajira Peninsula
into two equal areas; thus, Venezuela's territorial claims would have
been reduced. Nevertheless, whether the border was established at
7. The meaning of this term in regard to international boundaries in Latin
America is somewhat different from that ascribed to it in civil law and is
intended to denote permanent rather than temporary possession. In Latin
America, boundary disputes arbitrators were often called upon by the parties
to apply as their criterion the rule of uti possidetis of the period of independence,
in this case 1810. The assumption was that it was possible to trace, by a study
of the Spanish decrees, the precise lines of division of the former Spanish
colonies. However, this assumption was usually not borne out by realities.
It was found in many instances that the new states exercised at the time of
the cessation of Spanish rule-sometimes bona fide and without intentional
usurpation-state authority beyond the border, lines apparently designed as
the limit of their territorial jurisdiction. The state which has expanded in this
manner was prone to insist that the meaning of uti possidetis was administrative
possession as it actually existed at the time of independence, while the opposing
party usually contended that the principle implied the restriction of sovereignty
to those areas which were rightfully occupied by the antecedent colonial unit.
The two conflicting theories of uti possidetis became known as uti possidetis de
facto and uti possidetis de jure respectively. Thus, the doctrine of uti pos-
sidetis can be considered simply as a principle by which Latin America settles
its boundary disputes. It is not recognized internationally and is binding only
on those who expressly agree to its application. Y. BLUM, HIsromuc TITLEs IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 341-42 (1965).
8. CoNsTrrr=oN title I, § I, art. 2 (Colom.); CoNsnTmrrIoN title I, art. 5
(Venez.).
9. Treaty of Alliance, Friendship, Commerce, Navigation, and Boundaries
(also known as Pombo-Michelena Treaty), Dec. 14, 1833, Colombia-Venezuela.
See Carpio Castillo, supra note 4, at 77-85.
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Cabo de Chichivacoa or Cabo de la Vela, Venezuela would have re-
mained the only country situated upon the Gulf of Venezuela.
Negotiations did not resume until 1841. During these negotia-
tions, Venezuela again insisted that the border of the Guajira be
established at Cabo de la Vela. However, by 1841, the focus of the
controversy shifted, for the main territorial concern was no longer the
Guajira. Instead, the territorial dispute centered around the source
of a small stream, the Rio de Oro, which empties into Lake Maracaibo.
When it was discovered that the Rio de Oro had two branches, both
Colombia and Venezuela claimed the territory between the branches.
In addition, disagreement over an area south of the Meta River and
west of the Orinoco and its tributaries lessened the significance of the
Guajira dispute.' ° With respect to the Guajira, Venezuela reiterated
its insistence on Cabo de la Vela.
In 1842, Colombia markedly altered its position with respect to
the territorial dispute. Rejecting any notion of Venezuelan jurisdic-
tion in the Guajira, Colombia asserted sovereignty over the entire
Guajira and over territories as far east as Sinamaica, a town lying at
the entrance of the straits to Lake Maracaibo. To support these
claims, Colombia introduced newly-compiled Spanish documents.11
Evidently, Colombia's interest in these territories was based on the
discovery that the Maracaibo basin, belonging to Venezuela in the
sixteenth century, was later incorporated into the Virreinato of Santa
Fe of Colombia, although it was returned as part of the captaincy-
general of Venezuela in 1777.12
In 1844, another round of negotiations resulted in a severance
of diplomatic relations. Border incidents had become frequent be-
tween the two countries. In 1852, negotiations resumed and resulted
in an agreement to establish the border at Cabo de Chichivacoa.
Venezuela also sought to include a commercial accord and military
alliance in this agreement. However, Colombia objected both to the
terms of the commercial accord and to the inclusion of a military
alliance.
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, AREA HANDBOOK FOR VENEZUELA 309
(1964); A. GALINDO, EL ARBITRAMENTO DE LiMITES CON VENEZUELA 167-98
(1982).
11. See, e.g., Real C~dula de 1768, Real C6dula de 1786, and Real C6dula
de 1792.
12. See P. VILLA, NUEVA GEorRAFIA DE COLOMBIA 6 (1945). See also
Ascanio Jim6nez, supra note 1, at 26.
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By 1881, the two countries agreed to submit the entire border
dispute to arbitration."3  Alfonso XII, the King of Spain, accepted the
request to serve as arbitrator. Upon his death, the two nations agreed
that Maria Cristina, the Princess Regent of Spain, should assume the
role.14 Not until 1891 did she render her decision which abandoned
both Cabo de Chichivacoa and Cabo de la Vela, and instead marked
Los Mogotes de los Frailes as the border of the Guajira. Her decision
unfortunately produced only confusion since this site could not be
precisely identified. The reason for her decision remains unknown,
but certainly the result was to transfer more of the peninsula to
Colombia.'-
Venezuela had not expected such an extreme departure from the
traditional claims of either country. Venezuela claimed that execution
of the award required further administrative and legislative approval,
and thus avoided the enactment of Maria Cristina's border decision.
Subsequent efforts to implement the arbitration decision were futile.
The failure to arrive at an agreement was also partly attributable to
"golpes de estado" which occurred in both nations."
Seven years after Maria Cristina conferred the ruling, the two
countries affirmed the Rico-Briceno Pact to execute that decision.17
13. Treaty on Arbitration between the United States of Colombia and the
United States of Venezuela, Sept. 14, 1881, Colombia-Venezuela, reprinted in
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES ExTmuoaEs, supra note 1, at 9.
14. Declaration of Paris, Feb. 15, 1886, Colombia-Venezuela, reprinted in
MINISTEuo Dn RELACIONES EXTERuOnnS, supra note 1, at 11.
15. From the hillcocks called Los Frailes, taking as the starting point the
point nearest Juyachi, following a straight line with the line which di-
vides the Upper Valley from the Province of Maracaibo and the Hacha
River on the upper side of the Oca Mountains, the limits of the latter
mountains serving as boundary towards Valledupar on the side of the
ridge, and towards the Juyachi hillcock on the side of the sea coast.
Boundary Dispute (Colom. v. Venez.), sec. 1, reprinted in MINISTEmo DE
RELACIONES EXTEmOnES, supra note 1, at 12-14; Pu]ecio de Guarin, supra
note 1, at 144-46. An asserted copy of the map used by the Spanish arbitrator
places Los Frailes a few miles south of Juyachi. MINISTERmO DE RELACIONES
EXTERIORES, supra note 1, at plancha 1. But see Los ESTADOS UNIDOS DE
VENEZUELA, REPLICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE VENEZUELA A LA RESPUESTA DE
COLOMBIA 7 (1921).
16. During a visit to the Philadelphia Exposition in 1876, the Brazilian
Emperor, Dom Pedro 11, reputedly remarked that some of Brazil's neighbors
had more revolutions per minute than many of the machines on exhibit. In
fact, Venezuela is said to have undergone fifty-two major revolutions in the
first century of independent life. From 1899-1902 Colombia experienced one of
history's bloodiest civil wars, the so-called War of the Thousand Days. See
R. HuMP-REys, TRADITION AND REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA 13 (1969).
17. Convention Regulating the Extension of the Arbitral Decision on the
Question of Boundaries between Colombia and Venezuela (also known as the
COMMENT: GULF OF VENEZUELA
The Pact provided that the parties would agree to execute the judg-
ment of the Queen of Spain, and that a joint commission, composed
of representatives from both countries, would be named to demarcate
the boundaries. With respect to the Guajira, the joint commission
immediately was burdened by the problem of identifying Los Mogotes
de los Frailes. Only a general area could be located; a line was pro-
posed based upon recognized points in the Guajira as described in
the Spanish decision. The joint commission also determined that
Colombia was entitled to an area of 5000 square kilometers in the
Guajira north of the Venezuelan town of Castilletes. However, given
the non-commercial character of this arid region, little interest was
shown in accurate delimitation, and thus, no formal agreement was
reached.
Confusion over the Colombian-Venezuelan boundary persisted.
In 1916, Colombia and Venezuela agreed to another arbitration pro-
ceeding.'8 The President of Switzerland was designated as arbitrator
and in 1922, be affirmed the 1891 Spanish arbitration. With respect
to the Guajira, he declared that Colombia was entitled to take posses-
sion of the area north of Castilletes. "
This affirmation of a hopelessly confusing decision was obviously
unsatisfactory. Neither Colombia nor Venezuela could clearly iden-
tify its territory. As a result, in 1941, the parties conclusively estab-
lished their territorial limits in the Guajira and elsewhere, with the
town of Castilletes serving as the border on the Gulf.20 Thus, the
official boundary became a line extending to the Gulf, conferring al-
most all of the Guajira to Colombia, and, more importantly, providing
Colombia with a coast adjacent to the entrance of the Gulf of
Venezuela.
III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Gulf of Venezuela
The major controversy concerns the delimitation of overlapping
claims in the Gulf south of Castilletes. Colombia wants to apply a
Rico-Briceno Pact), Dec. 30, 1898, Colombia-Venezuela, reprinted in MINIS-
TERIO DE RELACIONES EXTEMIORES, supra note 1, at 15-16.
18. Convention between Colombia and the United States of Venezuela,
Nov. 3, 1916, Colombia-Venezuela, reprinted in MINISTERO DE RELACIONES
EXTE1onRES, supra note 1, at 73-74.
19. However, the principal controversy again revolved around the source
of the Rio de Oro, so the Guajira dispute became a minor issue. Boundary
Dispute (Colom. v. Venez.), I R. INT'L A.B. AwARDs 223 (1922).
20. See note 1 supra.
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median or equidistant line for this purpose.. Given the geographical
configuration of the coast, a median line would extend in a south-
easterly direction from Castilletes to a point equidistant between
Castilletes and the southern coast of the Gulf of Venezuela. From
that point, the line would run north between the Guajira and
Paraguana Peninsulas to the Caribbean Sea, dividing the entrance of
the Gulf into two equidistant areas. If, however, one followed any
latitude intersecting this median line south of Castilletes, one would
enter Venezuela.
Venezuela argues that the Gulf has economically, geographically,
and historically been Venezuelan waters since colonial rule. In re-
sponse to the Colombian proposal, Venezuela insists that the area
south of Castilletes is unequivocally Venezuelan territory and thus,
non-negotiable. The Venezuelan position calls for an extension of the
line from Castilletes across the Gulf in a northeasterly orientation
from the international borderline in the Guajira. This method
achieves an effect similar to the Colombian position: if one followed
any latitude to the west that intersects this "Venezuelan" line, one
would enter Colombia.
Los Monies
The other area of controversy in the Gulf concerns the territorial
rights, and particularly the continental shelf rights, pertaining to Los
Monies, a group of rocky, uninhabited islands which form an archi-
pelago about eighteen miles east of the northern Colombian Guajira
and lie at the entrance to the Gulf. The title to these islands had
provoked a heated discord between Colombia and Venezuela, par-
ticularly when the 1941 Treaty effected a border change finally plac-
ing Los Monies geographically closer to Colombia than Venezuela.
However, in 1952, Colombia expressly recognized Venezuelan sov-
ereignty over Los Monjes.21
Colombia would disregard any territorial sea and continental shelf
rights for Los Monies. Instead, Colombia would delimit this area as
between opposite states-the Guajira and Paraguana Peninsulas-by
the median line, as if Los Monies did not exist. In essence, Colombia
feels that it would be absurd to recognize continental shelf rights for
these uninhabited islands when Colombia's own continental shelf ex-
tends beyond Los Monies.
21. Letter from (signature illegible) to Luis Ger6nimo Pietri, Ambassador
Plenipotentiary of Venezuela, Nov. 22, 1952, reprinted in Carpio Castillo, supra
note 4, at 137-42.
COMMENT: GULF OF VENEZUELA
On the other hand, while Venezuela contends that Los Monies
has both territorial sea and continental shelf rights, Venezuela does
not attempt to enclose Los Monjes within its continental baseline.
Instead, Venezuela proposes that delimitation should proceed by use
of the median or equidistant line between Los Monjes and the Guajira.
Thus, a median line would effectively limit total Colombian juris-
diction to a distance of about nine miles from the Guajira Peninsula,
a proposition unacceptable to Colombia.
IV. APPLICABLE PRINCLPLES
In order to delimit the Gulf of Venezuela, one instinctively would
turn to relevant multilateral conventions: the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,22 and the Convention on the
Continental Shelf.13 However, although Colombia ratified the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, it was not a party to the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.24 Additionally, while
Venezuela ratified both conventions, it made express reservations to
the provisions concerning the use of the median line for delimitation
between opposite or adjacent states.' Because the applicable articles
22. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T.
1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (1958).
23. Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
450 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958).
24. Colombia voted for the six plus six formula, six miles of territorial sea
plus six miles of contiguous zone, introduced by the United States and Canada.
Venezuela opposed it. See generally Zuleta Angel, supra note 4, at 15. For
an account of Colombia's position at the Law of the Sea Conference by its
negotiators, see REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, MINISTEIO DE RELACIONES ExTE-
RIORES, INFORME DE LOS EMBAJADORES JUAN URIBE HOLGUIN Y Jos9 JOAQUiN
CAICEDO CASTILLA (1963).
In regard to the contiguous zone, the most likely disposition is to disregard it.
In light of the Santo Domingo Declaration, both Colombia and Venezuela are
among the nations advocating a twelve mile territorial sea with a two hundred
mile patrimonial sea or economic zone. The concept of the contiguous zone
thus could be abandoned. Among such nations this view appears prevalent
because there is no reference to this zone in any of the proposals on the patri-
monial sea or economic zone, and according to the statements made by the
sponsors of some of these proposals, the omission is intentional. See Santo
Domingo Declaration, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 70-12, U.N. Doe. A/8721
(1972); Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept, 11 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 579, 597 (1974).
25. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them
to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States
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have not been accepted unequivocally by both Colombia and
Venezuela, neither convention may be employed for the settlement
of this dispute.26
Several years before any international convention went into effect,
the International Court of Justice decided the Fisheries Case,2" which
involved delimitation of the territorial sea. Although that case par-
ticularly involved the validity of Norway's measurement of territorial
sea from baselines drawn between selected points on outlying islands,
certain principles may be relevant here:
is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, however,
where it is necessary by reason of historical title or other special cir-
cumstances to delimit the territorial sea of the two States in a way
which is at variance with this provision.
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 23,
at art. 12.
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of
two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary
of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined
by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the bound-
ary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the terri-
torial sea of each State is measured.
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of
two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be
determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement,
and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances,
the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, s-upra note 24, at art. 6.
The Venezuelan position regarding delimitation between opposite or adjacent
states was that it should be brought about by means of an agreement between
those states or through other methods recognized by international law. The
attitude was that the existing situations in the world were too diverse to justify
use of one general rule of law, and thus, the question should be left to the
parties affected. See Holguin Pel-iez, supra note 2, at 49.
26. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the issue was whether Ar-
ticle 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf reflected or crystallized a
rule of customary international law as contended by Denmark and the Netherlands.
They sought to apply the equidistance method of delimiting the continen-
tal shelf of adjacent states incorporated in Article 6 upon the Federal Re-
public of Germany, even though it was not a party to the Convention as
Denmark and the Netherlands were. After reviewing the history of the equi-
distance method, the International Court of Justice determined it was not a
rule of customary international law and thus was binding only on parties to
the Convention. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of
Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. 3
(hereinafter cited as North Sea Cases).
27. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 116.
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1. Delimitation of the territorial waters of a state always has an
international law aspect, even though the act of delimitation is a uni-
lateral act undertaken by the coastal state concerned.2"
2. A close dependence between the land domain and the terri-
tonal waters is an essential factor to consider. In the Fisheries Case, it
was the land which conferred upon the coastal state a right to the
waters off its coasts. A certain degree of latitude is necessary to adapt
the delimitation of territorial waters to practical needs and local re-
quirements.29
3. In drawing its baselines, a state must not depart to any appre-
ciable extent from the general direction of the coast. A fundamental
consideration in the Fisheries Case was the relationship existing be-
tween certain sea areas and the land formations which divided or sur-
rounded them. Such considerations should be liberally applied in the
case of a coastline with an unusual geographical configuration. One
relevant question in connection with the choice of baselines is whether
the relevant sea areas are so closely linked with the land domain that
it would be reasonable to treat such waters as internal waters.3
0
4. In addition to geographical standards, peculiar local economic
interests in the waters, evidenced by long usage, are to be considered.
A state should be allowed greater latitude if commercial activity, such
as fishing, is essential to the livelihood of a region. The term "long
usage," however, must not be confused with historical title. Historical
title is only one of several factors to be taken into account in applying
general principles of international law to a particular case.31
Additionally, in the North Sea Cases,2 the International Court of
Justice set out the principles and rules of international law applicable,
in the absence of a binding convention, to the delimitation of the
continental shelf between adjacent or opposite states. To summarize:
1. Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitable principles taking into account all relevant circumstances: a)
the general configuration of the coasts of the parties, as well as the
presence of any special or unusual features; 3 b) the physical and geo-
logical structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas
28. id. at 132.
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See North Sea Cases, supra note 26.
33. Id. at 54.
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involved; 34 and c) a reasonable degree of proportionality between the
extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State
and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the
coastline, which would be derived from a delimitation carried out in
accordance with equitable principles. 5 Wherever practical, delimita-
tion should include that part of the continental shelf which constitutes
a natural prolongation of each party's land territory into and under the
sea, without encroaching upon the natural prolongation of the land
territory of the other party."
2. If, in the application of the preceding subparagraph, the de-
limitation leaves to the parties areas that overlap, the parties may
agree to divide these areas into agreed proportions or, failing agree-
ment, the areas should be divided equally, unless the parties decide on
a regime of joint jurisdiction, joint use, or joint exploration for the over-
lapping zones or any part of them. 7
V. PROPOSED DELIMITATION
Gulf of Venezuela
Joint jurisdiction and joint exploitation occasionally offer a
palpable alternative solution to a dispute concerning overlapping claims
in marine and submarine areas that contain valuable resources. How-
ever, it is suggested that the application of those principles to this
controversy would not be feasible. These countries are neither
morally willing nor technologically prepared to initiate such an under-
taking. Such an arrangement, inevitably, would not meet the eco-
nomic expectations of the two parties. Moreover, the exploitation of
the natural resources of the seabed might be relatively inefficient, and,
therefore, comparatively unprofitable. Thus, precise delimitation of
the territorial sovereignty of each country should be applied.
The Fisheries Case and the North Sea Cases demonstrate that the
interdependence between the land domain and adjacent territorial
waters should be a basic consideration. A nation should be allowed
to adapt its delimitation to practical needs and local requirements.
While Venezuela has traditionally been a "maritime" nation, Colombia
has been a "continental" nation. Venezuela has developed its major
cities-Caracas, Maracaibo, and Valencia-along or near the coasts.
34. Id.
35. id.
36. Id. at 53.
37. Id.
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On the other hand, the major cities of Colombia-BogotA, Medellin, and
Cali-are located near the center of the Andean region. In fact, the
Guajira region of Colombia is almost uninhabited. Applying the
rationale of the Fisheries Case,as that the land confers upon the
coastal state a right to the waters off its coasts, it seems somewhat
unfair to permit Colombia, which had ignored these waters until the
possibility of oil exploitation was raised, to apply the median line in its
favor.59
A second fundamental consideration is the relationship between
the sea areas and the land. There should be a reasonable degree of
proportionality between the length of the coast and territorial marine
rights. Although Colombia's borders abut the western side of the
entrance to the Gulf, approximately eighty to ninety percent of the
Gulf Coast-and thus, most of the Gulf waters-are uncontested
Venezuelan territory. Except for its entrance, the Gulf is surrounded
by the Venezuelan coast. Since the Gulf waters are so closely linked
with the land domain of Venezuela, it is reasonable to treat them as
internal waters.
Finally, historical usage and local economic interests in the waters
are to be considered in delimitation. Since colonial rule, the coast
of Venezuela, as far northwest as Cabo de ]a Vela, was subject to the
captain-general of Venezuela. Venezuela has always been economi-
cally dependent on its coasts and the Gulf. In fact, the major oil
deposits in Venezuela are located offshore in Lake Maracaibo, only
a few miles inland from the Gulf. Furthermore, discovery and pro-
duction of oil in the Gulfs continental shelf would be directly tied to
commercial activities in nearby Maracaibo. Hence, by treating all
the waters south of Castilletes as Venezuelan internal waters,
Venezuela could efficiently develop this Gulf of Venezuela-Lake
Maracaibo region as a single economic zone.
Los Monies
There is no clear law with respect to the delimitation of archi-
pelagos. Many legal scholars argue that archipelagos should be the
subject of a special regime." In the Fisheries Case, the Court dealt
specifically with the utilization of straight baselines for the purpose
38. See Fisheries Case, supra note 27, at 133.
39. Compare Carpio Castillo, supra note 4, at 85.
40. See Amerasinghe, The Problem of Archipelagos in the International Law
of the Sea, 23 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 539 (1974); O'Connell, Mid-Ocean Archi-
pelagos in International Law, 45 Bar. Y. B. INTL L. 1 (1971).
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of measuring the territorial sea off a deeply indented coast with several
archipelagos. With respect to Los Monies, however, a straight base-
line with relation to the continental coast is not sought, the coast is
not deeply indented, and there are no other archipelagos.
Since the multilateral conventions are not binding on the parties,
equitable principles pertain. Several factors favor the inclusion of
Los Monjes as a territory of Colombia. First, the Colombian con-
tinental shelf projects beyond Los Monjes and compels Colombia to
reject the use of -the median line between the Guajira and Los Monies.
Second, there is the geographical proximity between Los Monies and
Colombia to be considered. Finally, this archipelago is neither in-
habited nor adaptable for life.
On the other hand, the weight of authority is that islands are
entitled to territorial rights.4 Islands must have the means to effect
generally accepted norms such as security, customs, sanitation, po-
licing, and vigilance. Therefore, it is proposed that Los Monies be
limited to total territorial sea and continental shelf rights to a distance
of three miles measured from the center of the archipelago. This
proposal, partially based on the old three mile territorial sea rule,
would recognize not only the uninhabitability of Los Monjes, but also
its need for the generally recognized norms mentioned above. More-
over, by limiting Los Monies to a three mile claim, Colombia can
maintain its own continental shelf claim beyond the territorial rights
of Los Monjes, subject, of course, to delimitation by the median line
as between the Guajira and Paraguana Peninsulas.
VI. DIsTINcTIoN BETwEEN ADJACENT AND OPPOSITE STATES
Delimitation of the Gulf north of Castilletes should be more
easily resolved than delimitation of the Gulf south of Castilletes. It
41. Article 10(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone states that an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide. Los Monies clearly meets this
requirement. In addition, article 10(2) states: "The territorial sea of an island
is measured in accordance with the provisions of these articles." Thus, an
island, regardless of size and other physical attributes, is entitled to a territorial
sea.
Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf allocates a continental
shelf to the seabed and subsoil adjacent to the coasts of islands. Considering
the shallowness of the Gulf, it is apparent that Los Monies has a legal con-
tinental shelf and, by projection, a seabed contiguous to the shelf. See generally
J. GAMBLE & G. PoNTEcoRvo, LAW OF THE SEA: THE EMERGiNc REGImE OF
THE OCEANS 137, 149 (1973).
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is easier to use the median line to delimit between opposite states,
such as the Guajira and Paraguana Peninsulas, than between adjacent
states, such as the Colombian and Venezuelan Guajira. The con-
tinental shelf area which extends from, and divides opposite states
can be claimed by each State as a natural prolongation of its territory.
These prolongations meet and overlap and, therefore, can easily be
delimited by a median line. Such a line generally effects an equal
division of the particular area involved.
However, in the case of adjacent states, a median line often results
in allocating to one of the states significant regions that are a natural
prolongation of the territory of the other. The distorted effects of a
median line between adjacent countries are comparatively slight when
applied to territorial waters, but may be more serious when applied to
the continental shelf." In the case of a concave or recessed coast,
such as that of the Venezuelan coast, the effect of the median line
is to pull the line of the boundary inward, in the direction of the
concavity. In contrast, the effect of coastal projections, or of convex
or outwardly curving coasts, such as the Colombian Guajira, is to cause
boundary lines drawn on an equidistant basis to leave the coast on
divergent courses, thus having a widening tendency on the area of
continental shelf off that coast. Thus, equidistant lines do not always
divide boundaries equally, but tend to favor the country which has a
projecting coastline."
VII. CONCLUSION
Indeed, "perhaps no more interesting problem of this sort could
have been posed." 4  Although the median or equidistance line is
suitable for settling overlapping claims between opposite states, it is
not always suitable when delimiting between adjacent states, especially
when special circumstances call for a different result. The heart of
this problem surfaces when the median line proposed by one country
would "intrude" into traditional territorial claims of the other. Di-
vision of the area south of Castilletes is as non-negotiable to Venezuela
as the use of the median line between Los Monjes and the Guajira is
unacceptable to Colombia. Neither Spanish documents, international
conventions, nor domestic law alone will solve the problem. Instead,
equitable principles taking into account all the relevant circumstances
and traditions of the two countries must govern.
42. Compare North Sea Cases, supra note 26, at 36-37.
43. See id. at 17-18.
44. Boggs, supra note 4.
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Thus, this author proposes that recognition of the Gulf south of
Castilletes as internal Venezuelan waters will resolve the problem more
satisfactorily than use of the median line. Furthermore, Los Monies
should be independently limited to total territorial sea rights of three
miles in order to recognize the natural prolongation of the Colombian
coast. Finally, the remaining area at the entrance of the Gulf should
be delimited by the median line.
